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to assist in reconvening the ICG on the grounds that it was premature. When the GKR attempted to contact GRUNK representatives in Moscow under guise of a visiting sports group, the trip was at the last moment not authorized by the USSR. By and large, the Soviets probably do not have a great interest in Cambodia and view it principally in terms of their relations with Hanoi. The Soviets have almost no influence in Cambodia today and might have even less if the insurgents come to power and circumscribe Soviet activities the same way they are circumscribed in Hanoi.

Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov told his New Zealand colleague in Peking on October 30 that his own views "from this corner" were that you are coming to Peking chiefly to work out a "compromise" solution on Cambodia; that Chou En-lai has his own reasons for wanting a settlement because Sihanouk is a wasting asset; that the USSR wants a negotiated settlement in Cambodia and the DRV wants the fighting there stopped because it wants to get on with the job of economic reconstruction. Tolstikov remarked that no understanding had been reached between the U.S. and USSR on ways and means of bringing about a Cambodian settlement. The New Zealand Ambassador commented he was left with the impression that Tolstikov believed you would succeed in working out a Cambodian solution while in Peking, and that Tolstikov was a bit afraid the Soviet Union would be left out in the cold. (Tab X)

H. DRV Position

For over 40 years, Vietnamese Communist leaders have pursued the goal of establishing control over all of Indochina. As late as 1949, they were still openly advocating the establishment of an "Indochinese Peoples' Republic." Since then, however, they have, for cosmetic purposes, been more circumspect and have publicly claimed to support an independent and neutral Cambodia (and Laos). It thus seems likely that Hanoi wants to establish a regime in Phnom Penh which it can control from behind the scenes. For this reason, the North Vietnamese would no doubt prefer an exclusively Khmer Communist government; however, should the military situation remain stalemated through the 1973-74 dry season, Hanoi might seriously consider a Laos-type solution if it believed the Communists would prevail in a coalition. The other alternative would be large-scale NVA intervention

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which would probably succeed militarily, but would be a blow to insurgent prestige and would incur some risk of GVN and possibly (though not likely) U.S. intervention. In any case, the DRV is not likely to make such a decision before the end of the year when it has had a chance to assess the insurgents' dry season performance. The DRV probably did not expect the Phnom Penh government to survive very long after the August 15 bombing halt, and was no doubt surprised (as were many on our side) that Phnom Penh, surrounded by insurgent forces, did not somehow disintegrate after the bombing halt. This has no doubt prompted a complete review of the DRV's strategy in Cambodia--particularly in respect to direct, large-scale NVA participation in the war. (Hanoi presently has 21,000 troops in Cambodia, of whom 3,000 are combat and 18,000 are administrative services (e.g., logistical) personnel. Since January 27, 1973, Hanoi has shifted some 15,000 troops from Cambodia to South Vietnam.)

Apart from its long-range objective of establishing hegemony over Indochina, Hanoi would probably like to bring the war in Cambodia to a satisfactory conclusion as soon as possible in order to:

-- free resources and manpower for the main effort in South Vietnam;

-- gain the use of Kompong Som port (which would greatly enhance the resupply and reinforcement of forces in MR's III and IV of South Vietnam);

-- obtain more indigenous resources (especially rice) in Cambodia; and to

-- gain the political and psychological advantage in South Vietnam which would result from the defeat or eclipse of the present Phnom Penh government.

Sihanouk has both enhanced and complicated Hanoi's efforts in respect to Cambodia. His international prestige has been useful in the political

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and diplomatic arena. On the other hand, he remains an unpredictable and sometimes uncontrollable free spirit whose public utterances are often an embarrassment both to Hanoi and the insurgents. In 1971, Hanoi assigned Ieng Sary to keep tabs on Sihanouk and to accompany him wherever he goes. This, however, has not kept Sihanouk completely under control. Hanoi repeatedly voices public support for Sihanouk as "head of state" and "the legitimate, genuine and consistent representative of the state of Cambodia"; but Hanoi would want to see his role severely restricted should he ever return to Cambodia. Hanoi also has consistently demanded that the U.S. cease all "interference" in Cambodia and that the Cambodian problem be settled on terms formally announced by Sihanouk and GRUNK (e.g. Sihanouk's Five Points).

I. Material Aid to Cambodia

The United States, this fiscal year in Cambodia, plans to spend \$75 million from the AID budget and approximately \$80 million in PL-480 funds. Our earlier plans for FY 74 Cambodian military assistance called for about 180 million dollars worth of ammunition, supplies and almost \$6 million for training. The end of US bombing and ammunition expenditures of between \$600,000 and \$800,000 daily have now resulted in projected military and requirements for this fiscal year of \$310 to \$320 million. Total USG FY 74 expenditures (if all funds are obtained) would therefore be approximately \$475 million.

US military aid is designed to enable the GKR to field a 220,000 man light infantry force with a 30,000 man supporting staff. We are concentrating on basic defense needs and discouraging massive military programs. Attrition of material and ammunition expenditures will account for more than 80% of MAP expenses.

Our economic help basically supplies foreign exchange for essential imports to shore up the government until its economy can return to normal conditions.

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US-DRV Exchanges on Cambodia

- A. US Draft Understanding, May 23, 1973
- B. US Draft Understanding, June 4, 1973
- C. US-DRV Agreed Understanding, June 13, 1973
- D. US Note to DRV, Oct. 4, 1973
- E. DRV Reply, Oct. 23, 1973
- F. US Note to DRV, Nov. ⁴, 1973

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRETINFORMATION

November 2, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

WILLIAM L. STEARMAN 

SUBJECT:

Chinese Opposition to DRV Hegemony
in Indochina

Peking's willingness to restrain the North Vietnamese and to help us in Indochina is probably in part determined by China's basic position on Hanoi's role in Indochina. China analysts tend to believe that the PRC opposes Hanoi's hegemony in Indochina. On the other hand, there is evidence to support another view that China is either resigned to, unconcerned about or even desires Hanoi's eventual domination of Indochina. The paper at Tab A examines this question and concludes that available facts tend to support the latter thesis. If this thesis is in fact valid (which we cannot really know), Chinese willingness to pressure Hanoi into delaying an offensive or making concessions on Cambodia would be mainly determined by Peking's desire to improve relations with the U. S. -- not by a desire to thwart North Vietnamese ambitions in Indochina.

The following is a summary of the principal points made in the attached paper:

China Opposes DRV Hegemony

- China fears Hanoi could fall under Soviet influence.
- China also fears that a Hanoi-controlled Indochina could be a troublesome rival in Southeast Asia.
- China would like to play a primary role in the area and therefore prefers autonomous states in Indochina.
- There have been frictions between the DRV and PRC, and the PRC has taken steps in respect to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam which indicate a Chinese preference for a balkanized Indochina.

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China Favors DRV Hegemony

-- The xenophobic North Vietnamese would actually restrict the Soviet role in an Indochina under their control. The USSR could not likely gain bases or special influence which would be inimical to Chinese interests.

-- China's power position vis-a-vis a unified Indochina would still be overwhelming and not really open to challenge.

-- The PRC and DRV have been compatible neighbors with no lasting differences.

-- Chinese road building in Laos can be seen as supporting the North Vietnamese position there.

-- China and the DRV appear to be in basic agreement on Cambodia. Cooperation in this regard is illustrated by Chinese acceptance and even enhancement of the role of Ieng Sary, Hanoi's watchdog on Sihanouk. Moreover, after Sihanouk's ouster, the Chinese offered to reject Sihanouk and to recognize the new government, if the North Vietnamese were given a free hand in Cambodia.

-- The Chinese have been more forthcoming than the Soviets in supporting Hanoi's position vis-a-vis South Vietnam.

-- Soviet policy toward Laos and Cambodia indicate the USSR is more interested in a balkanized Indochina than is China. For example, continued Soviet recognition of the Lon Nol Government was contrary to DRV interests.

-- China has long known of the Vietnamese Communist leaders' designs on Indochina and has, nevertheless, substantially supported their efforts in the area.

-- China has supported Hanoi's call for Indochinese unity and has supported Hanoi-controlled elements in Indochina.